The CCF entered the Korean War with a short, violent probing offensive. Although elements of three CCF Armies ... the 38th, 39th, and 40th ... were in place, apparently only about 30,000 CCF foot infantry were mainly deployed. These veteran troops, directed by skillful patrol actions and experienced planning, wreaked devastation among our unprepared and disorganized forces. They destroyed the ROK 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments and also inflicted about 800 casualties on our 8th Cavalry Regiment and capturing over half their equipment while smashing us back.

The CCF tactics were strange to us, they being extremely effective by night and by infiltration and highly effective roadblocks. Even their methods of communications, such as the whistles used in small-unit assault above, seemed eerie and helped demoralize many of our troops.

On November 5, the CCF broke off contact to evaluate the results of their attack and the capabilities of their enemies. This was musunderstood by the UN High Command, who were relying on China's intent by faulty CIA Intelligence. Still, they had ample information on the power and guile of the forces facing them in the field, and fatally underestimated both the strength and the intent of the CCF forces facing them. After re-grouping, Eighth Army again formed on the Chongchon River, and prepared to launch a general assault on November 25, an assault to get our forces "home for Christmas."

In retrospect, this was an incredible, incomprehensible blunder.

Shortly, China was to make a similar and equally fatal blunder.

Such is war.