At 0633 on September 15, 1950, LtCol R. D. Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5th
Marines, reinforced by tanks and engineers, some 1250 Marines in all,
landed in the assault of Wolmi Do Island. This island guarded the seaward
approaches to Inchon. These Marines were veterans of the vicious fighting
on the Pusan Perimeter. At 1700 that afternoon these men would have had a
ringside seat from which to watch the remainder of their Regiment assault
the beaches just to the left (north) of the causeway, and the 1st Marines
(Regiment) land on beaches to the right (south) of the causeway.
Taplett's landing had been preceded by intense fire from Navy and Marine
aircraft from Sicily, Badoeng Strait, Valley Forge, Philippine Sea, and
Boxer. The cruisers Toledo, Rochester, Kenya, and Jamaica added their six
and eight inch shells to the carnage on the beach, as did a dozen
destroyers and smaller ships. The piece de resistance were the ugly,
squat shapes of three LSMRs, the 401, 403, and 404 which waddled close up
to the already smoking island and ripple fired hundreds of rockets into
what was already a smoking fiery mess. You may bet that the Marines,
bobbing around in LCVPs waiting to go ashore, thought those "ugly, squat
LSMRs" were the most beautiful ships in the U. S. Navy at that moment in
time.
Some 400 North Koreans of the 2000 defenders of Inchon had been on Wolmi
Do that morning. When the fight was over Taplett's battalion would count
some 108 enemy dead and 136 prisoners. The 150 other defenders were
thought to have been entombed in sealed emplacements and caves throughout
the island. Marine casualties amounted to 17 Wounded in Action.
Naval gunfire support of Marine landings during WW II in the Pacific had
always been a problem. Not surprisingly, Marines wanted as much fire on
the objective as they could get, and the Navy almost always shortened or
cancelled scheduled pre-D Day bombardments. With the exception of the
landing on Guam on July 21, 1944, which had proceeded as flawlessly as an
amphibious assault across an enemy held beach could be expected to go and
with minimal casualties, the Marine Corps had never been satisfied with
the time and attention devoted by the U. S. Navy to shore bombardment.
Example after example could be cited where this occurred. Wolmi-Do and
Inchon would be an exception to the pattern which had developed previously
in that the quantity and quality of the pre-landing bombardments had
fulfilled Marine requests and expectations. The result of this
bombardment was that it saved Marine blood during the landing portion of
the operation.
Anyone interested in the issue of pre-landing bombardment and the
Navy/Marine Corps conflict regarding this issue is urged to read Holland
M. Smith's Coral and Brass. This book sets forth the Marine Corps side of
the argument, chapter and verse, through the Iwo Jima operation.
The above was courtesy of R. E. Sullivan, Colonel, USMC ('43/'67) (Ret.)
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